Pleading for a Bargain: The Upcoming Debate over Competing Standards of Prejudice in Missouri v. Frye by Hampton, Ian
HAMPTON COMMENTARY 12.20.11 V.3 (DO NOT DELETE)  12/20/2011 6:31 PM 
 
 
PLEADING FOR A BARGAIN:  
THE UPCOMING DEBATE OVER 
COMPETING STANDARDS OF 
PREJUDICE IN MISSOURI V. FRYE 
IAN HAMPTON* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Missouri v. Frye,1 the Supreme Court will address a novel 
question: whether a criminal defendant who pleads guilty can invoke 
the Sixth Amendment’s protection against ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his attorney’s failure to communicate an earlier, more 
favorable plea offer.2 In adjudicating this question, the Court will have 
to decide which of three competing standards of prejudice should 
apply, and which remedy is appropriate in this unique factual 
scenario.3 More importantly, the Court will be asked to weigh 
defendants’ interest in the reliability of the adversarial process against 
the state’s interest in the finality of its results, a balance carefully 
struck in past cases.4 
II.  FACTS 
On August 14, 2007, the State of Missouri charged Galin Frye with 
one count of felony driving for driving with a revoked license.5 Before 
his preliminary hearing, the State sent Frye’s trial counsel a written 
 
* 2013 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Siobhan Innes-Gawn 
and Kara Duffle for their thoughtful feedback and eye for detail. 
 1.  Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011). 
 2.  See Brief for the Petitioner at i, Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 
1593613, at *i (framing the question presented as whether “a defendant who validly pleads 
guilty [can] successfully assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by alleging that, but 
for counsel’s error in failing to communicate a plea offer, he would . . . have pleaded guilty 
sooner with more favorable terms”). 
 3.  See infra Parts V.A, V.C. 
 4.  See infra Part V.B. 
 5.  Frye v. Missouri, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-444 
(U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011). 
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plea offer.6 A date stamp confirms that trial counsel’s office received 
that offer on November 19, 2007, and his own annotations confirm 
that he read it.7 The terms of the offer presented Frye with two 
options: he could either plead to the felony with a recommended 
deferred sentence of three years, or he could serve ninety days on an 
amended misdemeanor charge.8 The offer was set to expire on 
December 28, 2007.9 Frye claimed that during the offer’s window he 
did not see or speak with trial counsel.10 Accordingly, he did not know 
about the State’s then-expired plea offer when, on March 3, 2008, he 
entered an open guilty plea to the felony driving charge.11 Shortly 
thereafter, the trial court sentenced Frye to three years 
imprisonment.12 
Frye then filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief in state 
court.13 Frye’s motion alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by failing to communicate the State’s plea offer.14 Following 
an evidentiary hearing, the court denied Frye’s motion.15 The Missouri 
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the lower court’s denial,16 and 
the Missouri Supreme Court denied transfer.17 
On September 27, 2010, the State of Missouri filed a petition for 
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.18 On January 7, 
2011, the Court granted certiorari,19 certifying the additional question 
of what remedy should be provided for ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea negotiations.20 
 
 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. at 352. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 353. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 361. 
 17.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 1. In Missouri, transfer is a parallel review 
process for motions for post-conviction relief that have been denied. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 83.04 
(“Transfer by this Court is an extraordinary remedy that is not part of the standard review 
process . . . .”). Because “motions for reconsideration . . . shall not be accepted or filed,” a denial 
of transfer amounts to a final judgment. Id. 
 18.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2010), 2010 
WL 3875742. 
 19.  Missouri v. Frye, 131 S. Ct. 856, 856–57 (2011). 
 20.  Id. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The starting point for any claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is the standard set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision 
in Strickland v. Washington.21 In cases preceding Strickland, the Court 
had held that the Sixth Amendment’s right “to have the Assistance of 
Counsel”22 includes the right to effective assistance of counsel,23 and 
that counsel could deprive a defendant of that right by “failing to 
render adequate legal assistance.”24 But it was not until Strickland that 
the Court articulated a clear standard for claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, which is still in use today.25  
Strickland’s “well-worn two pronged standard”26 first asks whether 
counsel’s performance was deficient.27 As the Court explained in 
Strickland, “this requires showing that counsel made errors so serious 
that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”28 Second—and more important 
to this case—the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient 
performance prejudiced her.29 Specifically, “the defendant must show 
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”30 Because of that language, the Court has come to refer to 
Strickland’s test for prejudice as the “outcome-determinative test.”31 
Notably, Strickland only addressed claims of ineffective counsel in the 
context of a trial; its stated purpose was “simply to ensure that 
criminal defendants receive a fair trial.”32 
 
 
 21.  466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 22.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 23.  McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[I]f the right to counsel guaranteed 
by the Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of 
incompetent counsel . . . .”). 
 24.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 25.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“There is no dispute that 
the clearly established federal law here is Strickland v. Washington.”). 
 26.  Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 699 (2011) (citation 
omitted). 
 27.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30. Id. at 694. 
 31.  See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 380 n.6 (1993) (referring to “Strickland’s 
outcome-determinative test for prejudice”). 
 32.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
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Within a year, however, the Court applied Strickland to claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel during plea-bargaining. In Hill v. 
Lockhart,33 the Court recognized that plea negotiations are a critical 
phase of criminal prosecution, on par with the trial itself, and thus 
warrant the same Sixth Amendment protections.34 Hill also illustrates 
that the Court views effective assistance of counsel in the plea-
bargaining context through the lens of the Due Process Clause.35 
According to Supreme Court precedent, involuntary plea bargains are 
a violation of due process.36 In Hill, the Court construed petitioner’s 
claim as “alleging that his guilty plea was involuntary by reason of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”37 Thus, the Court implied that 
counsel’s actions in Hill violated due process. 
Echoing Strickland’s outcome-determinative test for prejudice, the 
Hill Court held that the relevant inquiry is “whether counsel’s 
constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the 
plea process.”38 The Court went on, however, to say that “the 
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”39 Whether this last statement placed a gloss 
on the outcome-determinative test is a point of contention among the 
parties in this case.40 
Regardless, Hill is materially different from the present case. In 
Hill, the petitioner implied, but did not allege, that but for counsel’s 
failure to inform him about his probation status, he would have 
rejected the state’s plea offer and would have opted for trial.41 Here, 
Frye is alleging quite the opposite, contending that he would have 
accepted the plea offer in lieu of trial had counsel communicated it to 
him.42 Thus, Frye is not claiming that he was deprived of a fair trial; in 
 
 33.  474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 34.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (“We have long recognized that 
the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 57)). 
 35.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 36.  Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). 
 37.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 56. 
 38.  Id. at 59. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  See infra Part V.A. 
 41.  See Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (“Petitioner did not allege in his habeas petition that, had 
counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would have pleaded not 
guilty and insisted on going to trial.”). 
 42.  See Brief for Respondent at 8–9, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. July 15, 2011), 2011 
WL 2837937, at *8–9 (“Had counsel informed Frye of the state’s plea offer, he would have 
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fact, he did not want a trial at all. Accordingly, this case does not fall 
squarely within the ambit of either Strickland or Hill. 
In sum, aside from some notable aberrations in Lockhart v. 
Fretwell43 and Nix v. Whiteside,44 discussed below,45 Hill and Strickland 
represent the legal landscape facing the parties as they square off 
before the Court. It is worth noting that the Roberts Court seems to 
have taken an interest in questions arising from ineffective assistance 
of counsel in the plea-bargaining context, perhaps to better define this 
area. Two terms ago, for example, the Court heard arguments in 
Padilla v. Kentucky,46 holding that counsel performed deficiently by 
failing to inform his client of the collateral consequences of a guilty 
plea.47 Last term, the Court addressed the question of prejudice 
during plea negotiations in Premo v. Moore48 and is poised to do so 
again this term, both in the present case and its companion, Lafler v. 
Cooper.49 
IV.  HOLDING 
In Frye v. Missouri, an undivided Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed the lower court’s denial of Frye’s motion for post-conviction 
relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel.50 Under Strickland’s 
performance prong, the court held that trial counsel’s utter failure to 
inform Frye of the State’s plea offer “fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.”51 Notably, the State did not challenge this part of 
the appellate court’s holding in its petition for certiorari.52 
 
accepted it.”). 
 43.  506 U.S. 364 (1993). 
 44.  475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 45.  See infra Part V.A. 
 46.  130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 47.  Id. at 1483. 
 48.  131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011) (holding that counsel’s representation was adequate though 
he failed to file a motion to suppress defendant’s confession—a motion counsel deemed 
“futile”—before advising him to accept a plea offer). 
 49.  Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209 (U.S. argued Oct. 31, 2011). Lafler asks whether “a 
defendant [was] denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel where 
counsel’s affirmative misadvice causes the defendant to decline a favorable plea offer, and the 
defendant is subsequently convicted at trial.” Brief of Respondent Anthony Cooper at i, Lafler, 
No. 10-209 (U.S. July 18, 2011), 2011 WL 2837936, at *i. 
 50.  Frye v. Missouri, 311 S.W.3d 350, 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted, No. 10-444 
(U.S. argued Oct. 31 2011). 
 51.  Id. at 353. 
 52.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at i (posing the question presented as 
whether Strickland’s outcome-determinative test or Hill’s insistence on trial test for prejudice 
applies). 
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More controversial, however, was the second part of the Missouri 
court’s opinion, wherein it held that the court below had erred in 
concluding that, under Strickland’s second prong, Frye was not 
prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance.53 Here, the court 
applied Strickland’s outcome-determinative test to the plea-
bargaining context rather than Hill’s insistence on trial test, the 
standard more familiar to that context.54 According to the court, Hill’s 
test for prejudice was merely a “template” for “Strickland’s looser 
emphasis on whether a defendant can establish ‘an adverse effect on 
the defense.’”55 The court cited similar “adverse effect” language in 
Hill to support this claim.56 The court concluded that the proper test 
for prejudice was the one announced in Strickland: whether the result 
of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s error.57 
Although Frye did not contend that he would have opted for trial, he 
did claim that he would have taken the plea offer had he known 
about it, achieving a different result.58 Accordingly, the Court of 
Appeals held that the lower court’s denial of Frye’s motion was 
“clearly erroneous.”59 
Although the court found in favor of Frye on the merits, it 
declined to order specific performance of the plea offer as a remedy, 
stating that it lacked the authority to do so.60 Instead, it remanded the 
case to the lower court, acknowledging that although this could lead 
to an identical outcome, the “alternative is to ignore the merits of 
Frye’s claim, which we are unwilling to do.”61 
V.  ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 
The crux of the parties’ disagreement in this case is threefold: the 
applicable standard of prejudice, the policy implications of that 
standard, and the proper remedy. What follows is an exposition and 
analysis of both sides’ arguments. 
 
 53.  Frye, 311 S.W.3d at 359. 
 54.  Id. at 357. 
 55.  Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984)). 
 56.  Id. (“[T]he defendant must show that [a particular error of counsel] actually had an 
adverse effect on the defense.” (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 351. 
 59.  Id. at 359. 
 60.  Id. at 360 (“[W]e are not empowered to order the State to reduce the charge against 
Frye.”). 
 61.  Id. at 361. 
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A. The Standards Debate: Outcome-Determinative, Insistence on Trial, 
or Fundamental Unfairness? 
The main point of contention between the parties concerns which 
of three standards should be applied to determine whether Frye was 
prejudiced by his attorney’s performance. Frye urges that the proper 
inquiry is derived from Strickland itself and asks whether the 
defendant has shown a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”62 Under this outcome-determinative standard, Frye is all 
but assured of prevailing, given that the State does not dispute that 
Frye would have accepted the prosecution’s offer of a misdemeanor 
charge had he known about it.63 
The State counters that although Strickland required only a 
showing that results would have differed, Hill “altered that showing”64 
by requiring proof that but for counsel’s errors, the defendant “would 
have insisted on going to trial.”65 On its face, the State’s argument 
seems contrary to a fair reading of Hill. To begin with, the Hill Court 
stated explicitly that it was applying the “same two-part standard” as 
in Strickland to the plea-bargaining process, without caveats.66 
Moreover, the language relied upon by the State is taken out of 
context. The Court did require that “the defendant,” as opposed to a 
defendant, evince an intention to go to trial to meet the prejudice 
requirement.67 That, however, appears to be a case-specific application 
of a more general proposition adduced in the immediately preceding 
sentence, which reads: the “‘prejudice’ requirement . . . focuses on 
whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected 
the outcome of the plea process.”68 An insistence on trial inquiry is 
only relevant, then, insofar as it illuminates whether a particular plea 
process was negatively impacted, and not for its own sake. Thus, it 
appears that rather than altering the test in Strickland, as the State 
alleges, Hill is endorsing Strickland’s outcome-determinative test for 
 
 62.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 27 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 16. 
 65.  Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
 66.  Id. at 57 (emphasis added). 
 67.  Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
 68.  Id.; see also Roberts, supra note 26, at 704 (2011) (“Hill initially articulated a broad 
prejudice inquiry that asked whether, given competent representation, the outcome of the plea 
process would have been different.”). 
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prejudice. 
Appearances, however, can be deceiving; the Court has shown 
itself reluctant to apply Hill’s more general language to claims of 
ineffective counsel in the plea-bargaining context. Last term in Premo 
v. Moore, a case cited repeatedly in the State’s brief,69 the Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s finding of prejudice where counsel failed 
to file a motion suppressing certain evidence before advising the 
defendant to accept the state’s plea offer.70 The Court reaffirmed that 
Hill’s insistence on trial standard governs the “prejudice [inquiry] in 
cases involving plea bargains.”71 Significantly, the Court also rejected a 
concurrence below72 that reasoned that the defendant suffered 
prejudice because he could have negotiated a better plea offer but for 
counsel’s failure to suppress evidence.73 Thus, the Court has already 
rejected an argument that closely resembles the gravamen of Frye’s 
complaint—that Frye was prejudiced because, but for counsel’s 
omission, he would have accepted a plea offer with more favorable 
terms.74 
Furthermore, even if Frye could convince the Court to abrogate 
its holding in Premo, the State has another arrow in its quiver. 
Specifically, the State relies upon Lockhart v. Fretwell and Nix v. 
Whiteside for the proposition that an “analysis [like Frye’s] focusing 
solely on mere outcome determination . . . is defective.”75 Under 
Fretwell, the relevant standard is not whether counsel’s error 
produced a different result, but whether it rendered the proceeding 
“fundamentally unfair or unreliable.”76 As the Seventh Circuit noted, 
the fundamental unfairness test is a higher standard than the 
outcome-determinative test set forth in Strickland.77 Perhaps for this 
 
 69.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 18, 20, 35. 
 70.  Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011). 
 71.  Id. at 745. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Moore v. Czerniak, 534 F.3d 1128, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (Berzon, J., concurring), rev’d, 
131 S. Ct. 733 (2011). 
 74.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 27 (“Frye Suffered Prejudice Because Had 
He Been Informed of the Plea Offer the Outcome Would Have Been Different: He Would 
Have Received a Much Shorter Sentence . . . .”). 
 75.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30 (emphasis added) (quoting Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76.  Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369. 
 77.  See Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that “there is some 
superficial tension between Strickland’s statement of the prejudice standard . . . [and] the 
heightened prejudice standard in Lockhart”). 
HAMPTON COMMENTARY 12.20.11 V.3 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2011  6:31 PM 
2011] PLEADING FOR A BARGAIN 87 
reason, the Court in Williams v. Taylor78 clarified that the Fretwell test 
applies only in situations where counsel’s deficient performance “does 
[not] deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right to 
which the law entitles him.”79 The State contends that this is the case 
here80—neither Frye nor any other criminal defendant has a 
constitutional right to a particular plea bargain.81 Accordingly, the 
State argues that Fretwell’s heightened prejudice standard ought to 
apply to this case.82 
In a deft legal gambit, Frye attempts to redefine the procedural 
right in this case as an entitlement to information rather than a right 
to the plea offer itself.83 Specifically, Frye contends that because he 
“was entitled to be informed of the plea offer extended by the state,” 
he was deprived of a procedural right and therefore received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.84 Yet Frye claims elsewhere in his 
brief that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea 
involuntary and uninformed.85 Thus, Frye’s attempt to reframe the 
procedural right in order to avoid the heightened prejudice standard 
is circular: an uninformed plea is a predicate to ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and ineffective assistance of counsel is a predicate to an 
uninformed plea. Consequently, Frye’s attempt to divine a violated 
procedural right, thereby bringing his case within the ambit of the 
more lenient standard in Strickland, is ultimately unconvincing. 
In sum, the State has the edge in the debate over which legal 
standard to apply in this case. Given the Court’s decision in Premo v. 
Moore and Frye’s inability to coherently demonstrate a deprivation of 
his rights, the Court likely will apply Hill’s insistence on trial or 
 
 78.  529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
 79. Id. at 393 (emphasis omitted); see also id. (“Cases such as Nix . . . and Lockhart . . . do 
not justify a departure from a straightforward application of Strickland when the ineffectiveness 
of counsel does deprive the defendant of a substantive or procedural right.”). For an example of 
how the federal circuit courts have applied this threshold deprivation test, see United States v. 
Springs, 988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993), in which the Seventh Circuit held that because the 
defendant had “no substantive or procedural right to bargain-basement sentences . . . [he] did 
not suffer ‘prejudice.’” Id. 
 80.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 27. 
 81.  Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is without 
constitutional significance . . . .”). 
 82.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
 83.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 36 (“Frye was entitled to effective counsel 
who would advise him of the State’s plea offer. He was entitled to awareness of the alternatives 
available to him before he decided whether to accept a plea offer and plead guilty.”). 
 84.  Id. at 34. 
 85.  Id. at 24–25. 
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Fretwell’s fundamental unfairness standard to Frye’s case. 
B. The Debate Behind the Debate: Reliability of the Adversarial 
Process versus the Finality of Its Results 
The standards debate, critical as its resolution will be to the 
adjudication of Missouri v. Frye, sets the stage for an equally 
important policy discussion underlying the parties’ arguments. 
Strickland itself deemphasizes “mechanical rules”86 and urges courts 
to focus on the two competing interests implicated by the right to 
effective assistance of counsel—namely, the reliability of the 
adversarial process and the finality of its results.87 The outcome-
determinative standard set forth in Strickland is less of a legal 
talisman than a practical attempt to balance defendants’ interest in a 
reliable process with the state’s interest in the finality of convictions.88 
A low standard, which makes it easy for defendants to prove counsel 
was ineffective, would “encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness 
challenges,”89 thus undermining existing convictions. A high standard, 
which places a heavy burden on defendants to prove ineffective 
assistance, would prevent defendants from asserting their right to 
effective assistance of counsel, a fundamental part of a fair trial.90 
The parties, sensitive to the importance of these policy arguments, 
devote considerable portions of their briefs to discussing them. The 
State lays out a parade of horribles that will follow from the 
application of Strickland’s outcome-determinative test in this case.91 
The State makes two particularly egregious claims—that a decision in 
favor of Frye will lead to a proliferation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel challenges, and that it will provide defense counsel with an 
incentive to intentionally withhold plea offers from their clients. 
First, the State asserts that the application of Strickland’s 
outcome-determinative standard to plea negotiations will “fail to 
 
 86.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984). 
 87.  See id. at 693, 687 (discussing “the profound importance of finality in criminal 
proceedings” and of “a trial whose result is reliable”). 
 88.  Ivan Fong, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 
461, 486 (1987) (“Thus, Strickland appears to balance evenly the competing interests . . . .”). 
 89.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
 90.  See Fong, supra note 88 (“If, on the other hand, defendants face too stringent a 
standard for proving ineffectiveness, then their attorneys’ errors [would be] insufficient to 
establish a remediable claim . . . .”). 
 91.  See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 34–37. 
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preserve the interests of finality in a vast number of cases.”92 This 
essentially rehashes a concern the Court expressed in Strickland 
about the proliferation of challenges,93 only here, the State is arguing 
against, rather than for, the standard in Strickland. 
Is it plausible that the application of Strickland will lead to an 
increase in ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the plea-
bargaining context? At first blush, this seems likely: in 1983, the year 
before the Court decided Strickland, there were seventy-two district 
court ineffective assistance of counsel decisions published in a major 
database; in 2010, there were 7,687.94 Although this is a significant 
increase, ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to attorney 
performance during plea negotiations currently account for a 
relatively small portion of habeas petitions—around thirty percent.95 
As the Court recently noted in Padilla v. Kentucky, this may be 
because defendants who collaterally attack their plea bargains run the 
risk of a less favorable outcome on remand.96 One concern is that this 
“significant limiting principal”97 does not apply here. The remedy 
sought is not a new trial with all its attendant uncertainty, but 
precisely the same plea bargain that the prosecutor initially offered.98 
If challenging a plea bargain becomes a riskless endeavor—and 
raising a challenge becomes easier under the more lenient prejudice 
standard in Strickland—it seems reasonable that there will be more 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims of this nature. 
The State’s second policy argument is less compelling. The State 
contends that affirming the Missouri court will provide defense 
attorneys with a perverse incentive to intentionally withhold plea 
offers from their clients as an “insurance policy.”99 In the event that 
trial does not end in a verdict as favorable as the offer, a defendant 
could reclaim the banked offer by alleging ineffective assistance of 
 
 92.  Id. at 35. 
 93.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (concluding that a lower standard for prejudice would 
“encourage a proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges”). 
 94.  Westlaw Search Results for “ineffective assistance of counsel,” WESTLAW, 
http://westlaw.com (search “ineffective assistance of counsel & da(1983)” and “ineffective 
assistance of counsel & da(2010)” in the DCT database). 
 95.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 n.14 (2010) (citing VICTOR FLANGO, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 36–38 
(1994)). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 1485. 
 98.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 37. 
 99.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 36. 
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counsel.100 This argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, as the 
American Bar Association claims in its amicus brief, this 
“sandbagging” tactic would violate ethics rules because it would entail 
a failure to “communicate to [one’s] client an evidently advantageous 
plea offer.”101 This is not a viable strategy for all but the least ethical 
practitioners. Second, an iteration of the same argument could be 
made against ineffective assistance claims generally. Because post-
conviction relief is available for ineffective assistance of counsel,102 
defense attorneys will conceivably always have an incentive to 
“sandbag” in some way, hoping that their intentional mistakes will 
furnish the basis for a future ineffective assistance of counsel claim—
and a second bite at the proverbial apple—should they lose at trial. 
Yet, the Court apparently has not found this potential harm 
sufficiently compelling to overrule Strickland.103 
Despite the implausibility of the State’s “insurance policy” 
argument, the State’s arguments concerning the potential increase in 
ineffective assistance claims could sway a Court closely divided on the 
standards debate. Applying the less stringent standard in Strickland 
while permitting ineffective assistance claimants the remedy of their 
original plea offers may well lead to the relitigation of numerous 
guilty pleas.104 In order to avoid a deluge of ineffective assistance 
claims, the Court may decide in favor of a more stringent standard. 
C. The Question of Remedies 
If Frye prevails on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, he 
will still need to convince the Court that the appropriate remedy is 
specific performance—allowing him “to plead guilty to a 
misdemeanor with a recommendation of a ninety-day jail sentence.”105 
The question of the proper remedy for ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to communicate a plea offer is one of novel 
impression for the Court. In its order granting certiorari, the Court 
 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
15, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. July 22, 2011), 2011 WL 3151278, at *15. 
 102.  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (“This case requires us to 
consider the proper standards for judging a criminal defendant’s contention that the 
Constitution requires a conviction or death sentence to be set aside because counsel’s assistance 
at the trial or sentencing was ineffective.”). 
 103.  See, e.g., Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (“There is no dispute that 
the clearly established federal law here is Strickland v. Washington.”). 
 104.  See supra Part V.B. 
 105.  Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 37. 
HAMPTON COMMENTARY 12.20.11 V.3 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/20/2011  6:31 PM 
2011] PLEADING FOR A BARGAIN 91 
requested that the parties brief and argue an additional issue: “[W]hat 
remedy, if any, should be provided for ineffective assistance of counsel 
during plea bargain negotiations”?106 There are only a handful of cases 
remotely on point, but from the authorities cited by the parties, the 
shape of a permissible remedy in this context begins to emerge. 
In 1971, for example, the Supreme Court held that specific 
performance was an appropriate remedy in plea bargain cases, though 
subject to certain rules and restrictions: Santobello v. New York107 
establishes that, notwithstanding the Solicitor General’s concerns 
about displacing prosecutorial discretion,108 a court may order the 
government to “fully comply with the [plea] agreement—in effect, 
specific performance of the contract.”109 Specific performance is 
limited to executed plea agreements, however, and even then is only 
available to remediate an involuntary or unknowing guilty plea.110 
Furthermore, the trial judge retains the authority to reject the terms 
of a plea offer during sentencing.111 
Given these guidelines, Frye’s proposed remedy appears almost 
entirely appropriate for three reasons. First, Santobello establishes a 
precedent for the remedy of specific performance.112 Second, if the 
Court has reached the stage where it must consider the proper 
remedy, it likely will have already determined that Frye’s plea was 
involuntary or unknowing.113 Third, as Frye observes, ordering specific 
 
 106.  Missouri v. Frye, 131 S. Ct. 856, 856–57 (2011). 
 107.  404 U.S. 257 (1971). 
 108.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Missouri 
v. Frye, No. 10-444 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2011), 2011 WL 1536720, at *29 (“[E]nforcing the terms of a 
prior offer displaces prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 109.  Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009) (citing Santobello, 404 U.S. at  
263). 
 110.  See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507, 510 (1984) (holding that “[a] plea bargain 
standing alone is without constitutional significance . . . until embodied” in an executed 
agreement, and that “because it did not impair the voluntariness or intelligence of his guilty 
plea, respondent’s inability to enforce the prosecutor’s offer is without constitutional 
significance”). 
 111.  Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262 (1971) (“A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound 
judicial discretion.”). 
 112.  See id. at 263 (“The ultimate relief to which petitioner is entitled we leave to the 
discretion of the state court, which is in a better position to decide whether the circumstances of 
this case require only that there be specific performance of the agreement on the plea . . . .”). 
 113.  See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (noting that the cognizable claim in 
ineffective assistance cases within the plea-bargaining context is “that [defendant’s] plea was 
‘involuntary’ as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel”); see also Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 42, at 24 (“Failure to communicate a plea offer renders a subsequent guilty plea 
unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary . . . .”); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcomb, 412 U.S. 17, 28 n.15 
(1977) (“Because we have concluded that [Petitioner’s argument is not meritorious], we need 
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performance would not usurp the trial judge’s discretion because the 
ninety-day jail sentence is merely a recommendation.114 The one 
sticking point for Frye is that, as the Solicitor General rightly argues, 
the plea agreement was unexecuted because Frye never accepted it.115 
“[P]lea bargains are essentially contracts,”116 and without acceptance, 
no contract is formed.117 Accordingly, unless the Court alters its 
existing precedent in this area, Frye’s proposed remedy is actually 
inappropriate. 
VI.  LIKELY DISPOSITION 
The likeliest outcome is a reversal of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals. The State has two ways to win, each well grounded in 
precedent. First, the Court may hold that Hill cabined the application 
of Strickland to cases where defendants would have insisted on going 
to trial.118 Second, the State could prevail on its argument that 
straightforward application of Strickland’s outcome-determinative 
test is unwarranted under Williams because the loss of a plea offer 
does not amount to deprivation of a substantive or procedural right.119 
Indeed, in oral argument, Justice Breyer telegraphed that the Court 
might apply the insistence on trial or fundamental unfairness 
standard, endorsing “the idea of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the plea bargaining stage,” but proposing that the Court apply 
“two tougher standards for this area.”120 
Given the force of the State’s arguments, Frye finds himself in the 
unenviable position of having to argue against the weight of authority. 
First, he will have to convince the Court that his novel interpretation 
of Hill is warranted, despite the fact that the Court just recently 
rejected that interpretation in Premo v. Moore. Second, Frye will have 
 
not consider what remedy would be required.”). 
 114.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 42, at 45 (“The trial court retains the authority to 
reject the plea offer.”). 
 115.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
108, at 29 (“[I]nstead of restoring the defendant to his original position, the remedy of specific 
performance awards him with something he never had: a legal entitlement to the benefits of the 
offer.”). 
 116.  Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1430 (2009). 
 117.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 18, 50 (1981) (stating that a valid 
contract requires a “manifestation of mutual assent,” and “acceptance of an offer is a 
manifestation of assent to the terms thereof”). 
 118.  See supra Part V.A. 
 119.  See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) (“A plea bargain standing alone is 
without constitutional significance . . . .”). 
 120.  Transcript of Oral Argument, Missouri v. Frye at 16, No. 10-444 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011). 
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to convince the Court of his circular argument that an uninformed 
guilty plea is both the predicate and consequence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the plea negotiation phase. It is difficult to 
imagine the Court sustaining such an incoherent position. 
In addition to having the stronger side of the standards debate, the 
State benefits from the support of the Solicitor General’s office as 
amicus curiae. In the first two terms of Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, 
the Court sided with the Government in nearly ninety percent of 
cases for which the Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief.121 
Moreover, given the miniscule chance of prevailing on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim brought in federal court for a noncapital 
case—only one in every 1,692 is successful122—the probabilities weigh 
against Frye and his amici in this case. 
Nonetheless, Frye should be heartened by the Court’s holding in 
Padilla v. Kentucky two terms ago. Although the Court did not reach 
the issue of prejudice in that case,123 Padilla represents a significant 
expansion of the right to effective counsel.124 The Court imposed on 
counsel an affirmative obligation to advise clients of the collateral, as 
well as the direct, consequences of their pleas.125 Of equal importance 
to Padilla’s holding were its proponents: Justices Alito and Roberts 
joined the liberal wing of the Court in a concurring opinion.126 This is 
surprising, especially given Justice Alito’s dissent in United States v. 
Gonzalez-Lopez,127 in which he expressed characteristically pragmatic 
concerns that the finality of convictions would be imperiled if the 
right to counsel of choice, a close cousin of the right to effective 
counsel, were expanded.128 
 
 121.  Ryan Juliano, Note, Policy Coordination: The Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae in 
the First Two Years of the Roberts Court, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 552 (2009). 
 122.  See Joseph L. Hoffman, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 811 (2009) (citing a Vanderbilt-NCSC study). 
 123.  See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (“Whether he is entitled to relief 
depends on whether he has been prejudiced, a matter we do not address.”). 
 124.  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2011) (“Padilla is a landmark interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel . . . .”). 
 125.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 126.  Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 127.  548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 128.  See id. at 160 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the majority’s holding, some defendants 
will be awarded new trials even though it is clear that the erroneous disqualification of their 
first-choice counsel did not prejudice them in the least.”); see also Bibas, supra note 124, at 1150 
(describing Justice Alito’s approach as “intensely pragmatic. . . . befit[ting] his experience as a 
federal prosecutor”). 
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Perhaps Justice Alito’s concerns about finality were allayed in 
Padilla by the majority’s observation that collateral attacks on guilty 
pleas account for a relatively small fraction of habeas petitions. As 
previously discussed, however, the limiting principle posed by the risk 
of a less favorable sentence on remand does not apply here. Thus, 
Justices already concerned with the impact of ineffective assistance 
claims on the finality of convictions are bound to be more receptive to 
the State’s claim that a decision for Frye will “fail to preserve the 
interests of finality in a vast number of cases.”129 This was evident 
during oral argument when Justice Alito worried aloud that 
defendants could too easily prove prejudice under the outcome-
determinative standard.130 Accordingly, any liberal coalition in favor of 
Frye likely will not find an ally in Justice Alito or Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Alito’s codissenter in Gonzalez-Lopez. 
Similarly, Justices Scalia and Thomas will almost certainly oppose 
any decision favoring Frye. In his dissent to the majority opinion in 
Padilla, which Justice Thomas joined, Justice Scalia explicitly stated 
that he “reject[s] the significant further extension [of the right to 
effective counsel] that the Court . . . would create,” and implicitly 
called into question whether even Strickland was rightly decided.131 
In sum, the Court likely will reverse the Missouri court of appeals, 
rejecting the application of the Strickland standard to the plea-
bargaining context. Even if Padilla signals that the Court is favorably 
disposed to an expansion of the effective counsel right, affirmation of 
the Missouri court probably would be decided narrowly, in a five-four 
split. And, even if the Court were to affirm, it would be unlikely to 
order specific performance of the plea bargain because Frye did not 
accept the State’s offer. Ultimately, the decision will come down to 
what a majority of the Court finds more disconcerting: the ineptitude 
of Frye’s counsel or the finality concerns raised by the State. For the 
ninety percent of convicts who enter the criminal justice system on a 
plea bargain,132 much may ride on that determination. 
 
 129.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 2, at 35. 
 130.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 120, at 39 (Alito, J.) (“The point is just 
that prejudice isn’t going to be very tough to show, is it?”). 
 131.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1495 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. (“Even assuming the 
validity of these holdings . . . .”). 
 132.  Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1612 n.102 
(2011) (“[R]oughly ninety percent of the criminal defendants convicted . . . plead guilty rather 
than exercise their right to stand trial before a court or jury.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
